







Fiscal stress has led all New England states to limit growth
in cash assistance to the needy. Nevertheless, the rate of
growth in these programs since FY91 has varied widely, from
-1 percent in Massachusetts to +43 percent in New Hampshire
(Chart 1). Why such variation? Has Massachusetts really
become so much more restrictive and New Hampshire so much
more generous?
The answer is a qualified "no." To
be sure, the decline in Massachusetts’
cash assistance reflects in part the
conservative bent of its governor,
William F. Weld. However, shifting
political cultures explain only a small
part of the variation displayed in Chart
1. More important factors include in-
terstate differences in the mix of cash
assistance programs, job losses, and
the role of local government in provid-
ing assistance.
States provide most of their cash
assistance through three programs:
Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC), Supplemental Social
Security Income (SSI), and General
Assistance (GA). AFDC benefits chil-
dren (and their caretakers) who are
needy because at least one of their
parents is continuously absent, incapacitated, or unemployed.
SSI benefits needy aged, disabled, and blind individuals. GA
helps needy people who do not qualify for either AFDC or SSI.
Of the three programs, GA is the easiest to cut for at least
Iwo reasons. First, the federal government plays no role either
in setting minimum benefit levels and thresholds of eligibility or
in financing GA, unlike AFDC and SSI. Second, many GA
recipients are perceived to be more "employable" than those of
the other lwo programs.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the ~o New England states
tha~ have experienced the slowest
growth in their cash assistance bud-
gets, Massachusetts and Rhode Is-
land, also provided a relatively large
proportion of their assistance through
GA in FY91 (Table 1). Massachu-
setts has cut GA by 24 percent in
each of the last ~o years, largely
by tightening eligibility criteria.
Rhode Island, in addition to tighten-
ing eligibility, has reduced the length
of time that an individual can re-
ceive GA from 12 to six months per
year.
By contrast, the ~o New En-
gland states that provide little or no
state-funded GA, New Hampshire
and Vermont, have increased total
outlays for cash assistance since
FY91 by 43 percent and 15 per-
cent, respectively (Chart 1). Theyhave had difficulty slowing growth in this assistance because it
requires trimming the more intractable AFDC and SSI. In
addition, Vermont has been reluctant to abandon its tradition of
generosity toward the needy, although it did cut average
monthly AFDC allowances by 1 percent in both FY92 and FY93.
New Hampshire’s AFDC caseload has expanded faster than
that of any other New England state, both because it lost more
jobs (except for Massachusetts) and it had o relatively low
incidence of child poverty in 1989, when the recession began
(Chart 2). In addition, New Hampshire may have been lulled
into a false sense of fiscal security by the large Medicaid
windfalls it has reaped from the federal government (Fiscal
Facts, Spring 1992).
Given that in FY91 Connecticut had the highest ratio of GA
to total cash assistance in New England, one would expect the
state to have been relatively successful in restraining total
assistance growth. Instead, its total assistance has grown more
rapidly than that of any other state in the region except New
Hampshire (Chart 1). And this has occurred even though the
state has cut GA benefit levels sharply.
The apparent anomaly can be explained by the explosive
rate of growth in the state’s GA caseload (54 percent since
FY91), the result, in turn, of the state’s weak economy and
liberal eligibility criteria. Connecticut’s reluctance to limit eligi-
bility may be attributable both to its traditional generosity and
to the manner in which its GA program is funded. The state pays
for 85 percent of base benefit levels. Local governments pay for
the remaining 15 percent plus any additional benefits they
choose to provide. As a result, attempts to tighten eligibility, as
well as to cut the state share of total costs, have become
entangled in the politics of local aid. Maine, the only other New
England state with a similar cost-sharing arrangement with its
cities and towns, has experienced the second highest rate of
growth in state GA spending since FY91.
The New England states’ projections of cash assistance
outlays for FY93 assume that a slow, steady improvement in the
regional economy will cause growth in welfare caseloads to
level off. How will states react if this economic prognosis proves
to be overly optimistic? Will they appropriate supplemental
funds, cut assistance further, or attempt comprehensive welfare
reform, as several states in other regions have already done?
Fiscal Facts will monitor how states adapt. We now turn
to our summaries of recent fiscal developments in each New
England State.
Connecticut
Approved FY93 spending out of own-source revenues is
about 4 percent higher than comparable spending in FY92
(Table 2). However, the total approved general spending for
FY93 is about 10 percent below the amount required to keep
existing programs operating at FY92 service levels.
Although Governor Lowell Weicker and the legislature
agreed on the amount the state should spend, they differed
sharply on how to spend it. Governor Weicker wanted deep
cuts in local school aid, general assistance, Medicaid, and
pensions for teachers and state employees. The legislature
opted for smaller cuts in these programs and smaller increases
in other budgetary functions. It also enacted a new tax on
nursing homes. The tax, projected to generate $23 million in
additional revenue, will trigger additional federal Medicaid
grants (Fiscal Facts, Spring 1992).
Connecticut has recently expanded existing business tax
incentives and created new ones. It has broadened existing
property and sales tax exemptions for manufacturers and has
enacted incremental tax credits for research and development
and employee training. Offselting these tax reductions are
increases in fees and charges, expected to raise an additional
$25 million in revenue in FY93.
Maine
Maine ended FY92 narrowly in the black, despi|e the
enactment in March of a $26 million supplemental funding bill
appropriating additional FY92 funds for Medicaid, AFDC,
general assistance, mental health services, and corrections. The
most daunting fiscal task of the last quarter of FY92 was the
elimination of a projected deficit for FY93, estimated in April at
$155 million. The legislature accomplished this mainly by
cutting the compensation of state workers, requiring them to
take furloughs without pay, and reducing their workweek.
2 Fiscal Facts Summer 1992In June, voters approved a $79 million bond issue primar-
ily to finance infrastructure. Maine’s projected ratio of debt
service costs to total revenues will remain well within the state’s
self-imposed ceiling of 7 percent. (Bond-rating agencies
generally recommend 9 percent.) The current ratio is 4 percent.
The legislature rejected Governor John McKernan’s pro-
posed package of investment and job tax credits.
Massachusetts
FY93 appropriations are about 4 percent above FY92
spending. Items enjoying disproportionately large increases
are higher education and state aid for local schools, ~o items
that suffered especially large cuts in FY91 and FY92. Governor
Weld vetoed the increase in school aid because it was not tied
to educational reform. The legislature overrode his veto.
The legislature enacted none of the tax cuts recommended
by the governor, which included an array of business tax
cred its. However, the budget authorizes the phasing out of most
of the state’s current estate tax between FY94 and FY97,
leaving only a so-called "sponge tax." (A sponge tax is an
estate tax imposed by a state that can be used entirely to offset
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at the expense of the federal Treasury.)
The legislature’s version of the budget included two mea-
sures intended to ease the restrictiveness of Proposition 2-1/2,
lhe limitation on property taxes in the Commonweallh, but they
were successfully vetoed by Governor Weld. One measure
would have raised the maximum annual rate of growth in a
community’s property tax levy from 2.5 percent to the rate of
inflation. Another would have permitted localities to exceed the
limit in order to pay for tax abatements.
In July, the legislature enacted a $234 million spending bill
to be financed out of the Commonwealth’s FY92 surplus,
reported by Governor Weld to be $290 million. The bill
appropriated $100 million for.highway repair and $75 million
for a cost-of-living increase for state workers. Governor Weld
was threatening to veto large portions of the bill as this
newsletter went to press.
New Hampshire
In April, the legislature enacted a $55 million supplemental
appropriation to bolster funding for AFDC, food stamps, nursing
homes, and other selected social services through the remainder
of FY92. A more controversial measure, enacted in June,
authorized $10.4 million primarily for the purchase of transpor-
tation equipment and building repairs at the University of New
Hampshire. The controversy concerned how to finance the
purchases and repairs and whether the state can afford them.
In the initial version of the bill, they were to be financed entirely
through the issuance of bonds. Governor Judd Gregg objected,
on the grounds that all capital spending bills should be consid-
ered at the same time within the framework of a comprehensive
capital budget. The final version of the bill stipulated that some
of the expenditures should be financed out of current funds if
revenues came in higher than predicted. Governor Gregg
maintained that this financing arrangement was fiscally irre-
sponsible, given the imprecision of revenue projections and
disagreement over how much the state had actually spent to date
from all accounts, both "off-budget" and "on-budget."
Governor Gregg vetoed the bill, and the legislature over-
rode his veto. Governor Gregg has challenged the override in
court, maintaining that a valid override requires approval of
two-thirds of the entire legislature. Only two-thirds of those
legislators present voted for the override.
Rhode Island
Rhode Island is the only New England state to include
broad-based tax increases in its FY93 budget. Before the
enactment of the budget, the state imposed an income tax equal
to 27.5 percent of a taxpayer’s federal income tax liability ( not
Fiscal Facts Summer 1992 327.5 percent of income). The budget
raised the rate to 32 percent for taxpay-
ers with federal income tax liabilities
equal to or greater than $15,000, effec-
tive July 1. The rate increase is to remain
in effect for 18 months, after which the
across-the-board 27.5 percent rate is to
be restored. The temporary rate hike
gives Rhode Island an effective marginal
state tax on high-income taxpayers of
9.9 percent of income, the highest in the
region.
The new budget also extends the 7
percent retail sales tax to over-the-counter
drugs and authorizes state-sponsored
video gambling. The legislature rejected
Governor Bruce Sundlun’s recommenda-
tions for further broadening of the sales
tax base and a new 1.5 percent tax on
hospital receipts.
On the spending side, as in many
other states, the most sensitive budget
A!iHimz~ af DMlat-s Percent Change
CT 6,360 6,600 3,8
ME t,720 1..810 5.2
issues concerned the level and dislribution of state aid to
education and the level of human services spending. The
legislature rejected the majorily of cuts proposed by Governor
Sundlun in these two areas and made his proposed aid
distribution formula more favorable to wealthy communities.
Nevertheless, lotal appropriated general spending for FY93 is
extremely close to the governor’s recommendation.
A consullant to the state attributes much
of the shortfall to a sharp decline in
unearned income. Due to the large pro-
portion of retirees in the state’s popula-
lion, unearned income accounts for
almost one-fifth of Vermonters’ personal
income. The drop in unearned income
(according to the consultant) may have
been caused by the recent decline in
interest rates.
The shortfall in income tax revenues
increased the state’s cumulative deficit
to $65.5 million as of the end of FY92,
$10 million above the governor’s goal.
The deficitwould have been $16 million.
higher, had the state not transferred
$11 million from special funds and cut
spending by an additional $5 million
this spring.
In light of these disappointing re-
sults, Governor Dean has presented a
revised game plan that would eliminate
all but $4 million of the cumulative deficit by the end of FY93.
He wants the state to spend $20 million less of its FY93
own-source revenues than the $770 million appropriated in
April (general fund and transportation fund combined). The
$770 million already represents a 1 percent decrease in
spending from FY92 (Table 2).
Vermont
In January, Governor Howard Dean unveiled a strategy to
eliminate the state’s cumulative deficit by the end of 1993. So
far, the strategy has not worked as planned. Personal income
tax revenues for FY92 came in 15 percent lower than expected.
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